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The Center for Information Systems Security Studies and 
Research (CISR) is working on the Trusted Computing 
Exemplar (TCX)project-, which “will provide an openly 
distributed worked example of how high assurance trusted 
computing components can be built” [1].  One of these 
components is a small separation kernel that can enforce 
process and data separation. In addition, a reference 
trusted application will be built to use this kernel [2]. 
 
The motivation for the TCX project is the fact that few 
high assurance systems have ever been successfully 
completed or evaluated, and of these, they have all been 
proprietary.  Thus, it is extremely difficult for those new 
to information assurance to learn how to construct high 
assurance systems. An objective of the TCX project is to 
provide the information that will allow more 
organizations to consider building high assurance 
products.  It is intended to remove the “mystery” of high 
assurance development through a worked example. 
 
The validation that a system is high assurance is provided 
via an independent third-party evaluation.  A key aspect 
of a high assurance evaluation is the documented 
methodologies, standards, and processes that are used 
throughout the product lifecycle.  This paper presents the 
lessons learned to date through the creation of documents 
required prior to the engineering phase of development. 
 
                                                          
- This work was sponsored in part by the Office of Naval 
Research and the National Reconnaissance Office.  Any 
opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations 
expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of either the Office of Naval 
Research or the National Reconnaissance Office. 
II. COMMON CRITERIA 
The Common Criteria (CC) is an internationally 
recognized standard for security of computing products 
[3].  It predefines seven different levels of assurance, 
known as Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs), where 
EAL7 is the highest assurance. Each level is comprised of 
a set of requirements from CC Part 3, where each higher 
EAL imposes additional constraints or additional new 
requirements beyond those of the adjacent lower level.  
Thus, it is recognized that EALs 1 through 4 are “low” 
assurance levels, while EALs 5 through 7 are “high” 
assurance levels.  To provide the maximum benefit as a 
worked example, the TCX separation kernel is targeted 
for an EAL7 evaluation, which drove the documentation 
decisions described here. 
 
There is no simple or consolidated reference in the CC 
framework that describes the overall documentation 
requirements for a given EAL.  Instead, documentation 
requirements are interspersed among all the other 
assurance requirements, with related requirements 
sometimes found in different parts of the CC.  One must 
carefully assess all the requirements that map to the 
desired EAL.  Even then, the wording may be vague and 
must be interpreted.  In addition, the semantics of some of 
the terminology used in the CC differs from that of other 
standards with which the TCX team was 
familiar[TCSEC].  
 
In an attempt to minimize the risk of erroneous 
interpretation, the Common Methodology for Information 
Technology Security Evaluation (CEM) document was 
referenced [4].  The CEM document provides guidance to 
evaluators, and occasionally provides insight into what 
the authors of the CC intended when they wrote the 
requirements.  However, the CEM only provides guidance 
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for low assurance evaluations, so for many of the high 
assurance issues, the CEM was not helpful.  In addition, 
an update to the CC documents during the TCX initial 
documentation effort added to the difficulty. 
 
III. REQUIRED DOCUMENTS 
After studying the CC, it was determined that over 40 
documents are required for an EAL7 evaluation.  As 
overwhelming as that may sound, only the following short 
list of documents had to be in place before the start of 
development: 
• Documentation Standards 
• Life Cycle Plan 
• Configuration Management Plan 
• Configuration Management Procedures 
• Configuration Items List 
• Personnel Security Plan 
• Physical Security Plan 
• Software Development Standards 
 
Failure to create such documents prior to system 
development would render any attempt for a high 
assurance rating fruitless. They cannot be written post 
facto as an exercise to fulfill all high assurance 
requirements, because the opportunity to have them 
contribute to system assurance is gone.  Organizations 
that hope to receive a high assurance rating for a product 
must provide evidence that high assurance development 
practices were actually followed from the beginning of 
the product lifecycle.  Thus, the documentation not only 
describes what must be done, but also describes how and 
when evidence shall be created and maintained. 
 
During an evaluation, one of the first things that an 
evaluator will examine is whether the stated 
methodologies, policies and standards were good enough 
to qualify for the desired rating.  Once that test is passed, 
the evaluator will want to see proof that the organization 
actually adhered to them.  Therefore, when writing any of 
the documents listed above, the author must continually 
ask the question: “How will I prove that I did all the 
things I said I was going to do?”  In other words, what 
evidence will be needed to show that the stated 
methodologies, policies and standards were strictly 
followed from the start of development? 
 
Another challenge for the developer is knowing what is 
necessary and sufficient.  It is possible to go beyond the 
mark when considering how to meet all the requirements: 
to do more than the minimum necessary for the desired 
rating.  The evaluators would normally award the desired 
rating in such a case, but it will be at a greater cost to the 
developer than was necessary.  Therefore, another 
question to consider is, “Is this too much?”  It was 
valuable for the TCX documentation effort to have some 
team members keep asking this question.  
 
The order in which the documents are written is also 
important.  In our experience, the first five documents in 
the previous list must be created in the order given, with 
the Documentation Standards written first.  
 
It should also be noted that when the CC describes a 
documentation requirement, it does not mean that it must 
be met by a specific separate document – multiple 
documentation requirements can be met by a single 
document.   
 
IV. SUMMARY 
Although there are a large number of documentation 
requirements for a high assurance CC evaluation, our 
experience has revealed that only eight documents must 
be written before development can start.  However, for a 
variety of reasons when starting from scratch, these eight 
documents require significant effort, especially if one is 
not familiar with the CC.  Careful thought must go into 
these documents because they form the whole framework 
for a high assurance environment, and fundamental 
evidence that a product merits a high assurance rating. 
 
These eight documents, along with other TCX 
documentation and source code, will be made available to 
the general public at a future point in time. 
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